# Hartry Field

University Professor and Silver Professor of Philosophy;

Ph.D. 1972 (philosophy), M.A. 1968 (philosophy), Harvard;

B.A. 1967 (mathematics), Wisconsin.

#### Office Address:

Department of Philosophy

5 Washington Place

New York, NY 10003

#### Office Hours:

Monday, 4–5:15pm

#### Email:

#### Phone:

(212) 998-3795

#### Fax:

(212) 995-4179

#### Areas of Research/Interest:

metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics

#### Fellowships/Honors:

Lakatos Prize, for Science Without Numbers, 1986; National Science Foundation Research Grant, 1979-1980, summer 1982, 1988-1989; Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship, 1979-1980; National Endowment for the Humanities Research Grant, 1972-1973.

Hartry Field (B.A., Wisconsin; M.A., Ph. D. Harvard), Silver Professor of Philosophy and University Professor, specializes in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of science. He has
had fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation. He is the author of

*Science Without Numbers*(Blackwell 1980), which won the Lakatos Prize, of*Realism, Mathematics and Modality*(Blackwell 1989), and of*Truth and the Absence of Fact*(Oxford 2001). Current interests include objectivity and indeterminacy, a priori knowledge, causation, and the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes.#### Recent Book

*Saving Truth from Paradox*(Oxford 2008)#### Recent Papers (mostly with on-line links to not-quite-final versions)

- "Do We Have a Determinate Conception of Finiteness and Natural Number?", in Matthias Schirn, ed.,
*Philosophy of Mathematics Today*(Oxford University Press 1998), pp. 99–129. - "Which Undecidable Mathematical Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values?", in H. Garth Dales and Gianluigi Oliveri, ed.,
*Truth in Mathematics*(Oxford University Press 1998), pp. 291–310. - "Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects", in S. Laurence and C. Macdonald, eds.,
*Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics*(Basil Blackwell 1998), pp. 387–403. - "Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy",
*The Monist*, April 1998, vol. 81, pp. 253–73. - "Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic",
*Philosophical Studies*, 1998, vol. 92, pp. 1–24. - "Deflating the Conservativeness Argument",
*The Journal of Philosophy*, 1999, (pp. 533–40). - "A Prioricity as an Evaluative Notion", in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, eds.,
*New Essays on the A Priori*(Oxford University Press 2000), pp. 117–49. - "Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle",
*Nous*, 2000, pp. 1–30. - "Causation in a Physical World", in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman, eds.,
*Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*(Oxford University Press 2003). - "Mathematical Undecidables, Metaphysical Realism and Equivalent Descriptions", in Auxier, Anderson and Hahn, eds.,
*The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam*(Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court) 2015, pp. 145-72. - "Saving the Truth Schema from Paradox",
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 2002, pp. 1–27. - "A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes",
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, April 2003, pp. 139–77. - "Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False?", in Beall and Armour-Garb, eds.,
*Deflationism and Paradox*(Oxford University Press 2004), pp. 23–40. - "The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness", in Beall and Glanzberg, eds.,
*Liars and Heaps*(Oxford University Press 2003), pp. 262–311. - "No Fact of the Matter", in
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2003, pp. 457–480. - "The Consistency of the Naive Theory of Properties",
*The Philosophical Quarterly*, January 2004, pp. 78–104. - "Recent Debates about the A Priori", in Gendler and Hawthorne, eds.,
*Oxford Studies in Epistemology*(Oxford University Press 2005), pp. 69–88. - Contributions to symposium on
*Truth and the Absence of Fact*(Precis of book and responses to Gupta and Martinez-Fernandez, Loewer, and McGee),*Philosophical Studies*(May 2005), pp. 41–44 and 105–28. - "Variations on a Theme by Yablo", in Beall and Armour-Garb, eds.,
*Deflationism and Paradox*(Oxford University Press 2004), pp. 53–74. - "Maudlin's
*Truth and Paradox*",*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*(2006), pp. 713–20. - "Vagueness, Partial Belief and Logic", forthcoming in G. Ostertag, ed., Meanings and Other Things: Essays on Stephen Schiffer.
- "Compositional Principles versus Schematic Reasoning",
*The Monist*(2006), pp. 9–27. - "Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge", in JC Beall ed.
*The Liar's Revenge*(Oxford 2007), pp. 78–144. - "Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency",
*Mind*2006, pp. 567–605. - "This Magic Moment: Horwich on the Boundaries of Vague Terms", forthcoming
in Dietz and Moruzzi, eds.,
*Cuts and Clouds: Essays in the Nature and Logic of Vagueness*(Oxford). - "Epistemology Without Metaphysics",
*Philosophical Studies*2009, vol. 143, 249–90. - "What is the Normative Role of Logic",
*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 2009, vol 83, 251–68. - "Pluralism in Logic",
*Review of Symbolic Logic*2009, vol. 2, 342–59; http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S1755020309090182. - What is Logical Validity? Forthcoming in Colin Caret and Ole Hjortland, eds.,
*Foundations of Logical Consequence*(Oxford University Press). - "Naive Truth And Restricted Quantification: Saving Truth A Whole Lot Better",
*Review of Symbolic Logic*2014, vol. 7, 147-91. - "Disarming a Paradox of Validity", forthcoming in
*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*. - "Prospects for a Naïve Theory of Classes", co-authored with Harvey Lederman and Tore Fjetland Ogaard. Forthcoming in the
*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*. - "Indicative Conditionals, Restricted Quantifiers, and Naive Truth", to appear in
*Review of Symbolic Logic*. Published online Oct. 19 2015.

#### Graduate Courses

- Metaphysics: Causation (in conjunction with Ned Block),
*Fall 1997* - Seminar on Vagueness and Indeterminacy (in conjunction with Stephen Schiffer),
*Spring 1998* - Seminar on Logic and Philosophy of Logic,
*Spring 1999* - Seminar in Philosophy of Mathematics,
*Fall 1999* - Seminar on Theory of Meaning,
*Spring 2000* - Seminar on Causation (in conjunction with Gordon Belot),
*Fall 2000* - Mind and Language Seminar: Content and its Role in Explanation (in conjunction with Stephen Schiffer),
*Spring 2001* - The Semantic and Set-Theoretic Paradoxes (in conjunction with Kit Fine),
*Fall 2001* - Mind and Language Seminar: Factually Questionable Discourse (in conjunction with Stephen Schiffer),
*Spring 2003* - Seminar in Philosophy of Logic,
*Fall 2003* - Seminar in Logic,
*Spring 2004* - Seminar in Philosophy of Logic (in conjunction with Crispin Wright),
*Spring 2005* - Seminar on Truth,
*Fall 2005* - Seminar on Semantic Paradoxes,
*Fall 2006* - Mind and Language Seminar: Formal Epistemology (in conjunction with Jim Pryor),
*Spring 2007* - Seminar on Norms of Rationality,
*Fall 2007* - Thesis Preparation Seminar,
*Spring 2008* - Seminar on Foundations of Mathematics,
*Fall 2008* - Seminar on Philosophy of Mathematics,
*Spring 2009* - Pro-seminar (with Ted Sider),
*Fall 2009* - Logic (Classical and Non-Classical),
*Spring 2010* - Seminar on Truth,
*Spring 2011* - Pro-seminar (with Stephen Schiffer),
*Fall 2011* - Seminar on the Revisability of Logic (with Graham Priest),
*Fall 2011* - Seminar on Factually Defective Discourse,
*Fall 2012* - Seminar on Probability (with Paul Horwich),
*Spring 2013* - Seminar on Truth and Vagueness,
*Fall 2013* - Pro-seminar (with Cian Dorr),
*Fall 2014* - Seminar on Conditionals (with Graham Priest),
*Fall 2014* - Seminar on Applied Mathematics (with Cian Dorr),
*Fall 2015* - Logic for Philosophers,
*Spring 2016*

Updated on 03/10/2017