Research Seminar on Mind, Language, Etc 2007
Epistemic Rationality
The Spring 2007 Research Seminar on Mind, Language, Etc will be conducted by Hartry Field and Jim
Pryor. The seminar will
address issues about epistemic rationality. Specifically, we'll be focusing
on:
1. Work that addresses the relationship between formal systems (logic,
probability theory) and epistemic rationality as it's been more
traditionally conceived.
2. The significance of higher-order epistemic evaluations (e.g.,
evidence concerning the strength of one's evidence, evidence that others
possess certain evidence, evidence concerning one's own rationality or
reliability), possibly in relation to the problem of rational disagreement.
Open meetings with seminar visitors will take place in the Seminar Room of
the Philosophy Department on Tuesdays from 4:00 to 7:00 pm; a preparation
session, restricted to students enrolled in the course, will meet on Monday
evenings. Papers to be discussed at each Tuesday meeting will be available
one week in advance, and will be distributed at the preceding Tuesday
meeting. Copies will also be available at the Philosophy Department: Room
503 in the Silver Center (100 Washington Square East). In addition,
visitors¹ papers will be available for downloading from this website.
Many of the papers linked to below are password-protected. The username for the papers is "evidence" and the password will be announced in class.
Weekly Schedule
Tuesday Jan 16. Intro by Hartry and Jim
Tuesday Jan 23. Adam Elga
Please read If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? by Cohen, The Illusion of Defeat by Talbott, and Lucky to Be Rational by Elga. But I Could be Wrong by Sher is optional.
Tuesday Jan 30. Brian Weatherson
Please read The Bayesian and the Dogmatist. From Prof Weatherson: If people wanted to read Jim Pryor's "Sceptic and the Dogmatist" (if they haven't already) or Roger White's "Problems for Dogmatism", or my "Keynes, Uncertainty and Interest Rates" (on my website) any of those might help with some of the background.
Tuesday Feb 6. Mark Kaplan
ANNOUNCEMENT: Mark Kaplan will not be able visit on February 6, due to a death in his
family. The Mind and Language seminar will still meet in his absence, to
discuss the work he sent.
Please read Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: A Response to Christensen and Decision Theory and Epistemology.
Tuesday Feb 13. Frank Arntzenius
Please read Gibbard's Rational Credence and the Value of Truth, Arntzenius's comment Rationality and Self-Confidence, and Gibbard's reply Aiming at Truth Over Time.
Tuesday Feb 20. Richard Feldman
Please read Respecting the Evidence and Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement by Feldman, as well as Disagreeing About Disagreement by Weatherson.
Tuesday Feb 27. Jim Pryor
Please read Uncertainty and Undermining.
Tuesday Mar 6. David Christensen
Please read Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals and
Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News
Tuesday Mar 13. SPRING BREAK
Tuesday Mar 20. Thony Gillies
Please read Reflective Modalities and Theory Change by
Andre Fuhrmann and What Might Be the Case After a Change in View by Gillies.
Tuesday Mar 27. Branden Fitelson
From Prof. Fitelson: The paper I'd like to focus on the most is my new paper
on the "grue" paradox (still a work in progress, but pretty polished
by now). A slightly lower priority would be to discuss my (recently
published) paper on the "ravens" paradox. The "grue" paper
presupposes some things from the "ravens" paper, and they naturally
complement each other in various other ways as well. So, I think
they'd make a good pair. If forced to choose just one, I'd choose
the "grue" paper.
(1) "Grue" paper
(2) "Ravens" paper
There is also one "theoretical background" paper that might be of
some use (some of its formal results are salient to the "grue" paper):
(3) Synthese paper
This might be useful to have in the background of the "grue" discussion, but is not essential.
Tuesday Apr 3. BREAK FOR PACIFIC APA
Tuesday Apr 10. Scott Sturgeon
Please read Reason and the Grain of Belief
Tuesday Apr 17. Tom Kelly
Please read Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.
Background reading: The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, especially sections 1, 4, and 6.
Tuesday Apr 24. Jim Joyce
Please read Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic
Epistemology of Partial Belief.
From Prof Joyce: If people wanted to read something else, the first four sections of my old paper A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism," (Philosophy of Science, 65:575-603) are useful background.
Tuesday May 1. (the day after the last day of classes) Alan Hájek
Please read Arguments For - or Against - Probabilism?
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